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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CARL H. POWELL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

vs.

s. TONY COX, Director
Driver License Division
Utah Dept. of Public Safety,

Case No. 16660

Defendant/Respondent.
Since appellant is willing to submit this matter on
the briefs of appellant and respondent, appellant submits
this brief in reply to respondent's Brief on Appeal.
REPLY
There is no questions that appellant supplied the
testing officer with a cylinder full of breath air and the
uncontroverted evidence is:
"Q.

And Officer Curtis never turned to analyze the

55 c.c.'s that was provided?
A.

No, he did not?"

(R 29)

41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated grants to a peace officer
the right to select the testing mechanism to be used.

Nowhere

in that section of the code nor in 41-6-44.lO(b) Utah Code
Annotated is the manner of administering a breathalyzer test
outlined by our legislature.
It is apparent from all citations that a sample was
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obtained in sufficient quantity to analyze although this
sample may not have met with the subjective desires of the
arresting officer, it was he whose chose not to analyze
the sample.
Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 94 Cal, Rptr.
182, 185 (Cal. App.-1971) is not applicable as Utah differs
from California in that only a single test is required of a
validly arrested driver who " . . . shall be deemed to have
given his consent to a chemical test .

-,,c

DATED this

l.fJ__

.

" (Emphasis added.)

day of January, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
McRAE & DeLAND

ROBERT M. McRAE
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a
copy of the foregoing to Bruce, M. Hale, Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
/(),

day of January, 1980.

ROBERT M. McRAE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

84114 on thl!

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Number
STATEt~ENT

OF nATURE OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I

POINT II

POINT III
CONCLUSION

THE DECREE FOR REFORMATION WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW BEING BASED UPON
A FINDING OF "NO MEETING OF THE
MINDS." . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
FINDING MUTUAL MISTAKE OR UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND FRAUD

6

THOMPSONS WERE GUILTY OF
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE

9

THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE ENFORCED
AS WRITTEN
. . . . . . . . . .

10

AUTHORITIES CITED

Smith v. Whitlaw, 268 P.2d 1031

(Colo. 1954") . . . . . .

9

66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments
§12 (1973)

. . . . . . . . . . .

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TJ[CJ;!AS T. THOMPSON and
LULA TllO'.'lPSON, his wife,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vs-

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Q. KEITH SMITH and
ROSSLYN SMITH, his wife,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Case No. 16662

)
)
)

)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action between Sellers (PlaintiffsRespondents) and Purchasers (Defendants-Appellants) of a
business, including certain real estate upon which the
business was located.
The Sellers sought, alternatively, to reform or
rescind the sale agreement, while the Purchasers sought its
specific enforcement.

The dispute centered around the

interest provision of the contract.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following trial below, the Court entered a decree
of reformation in favor of the Plaintiff-sellers and against
the Defendant-purchasers.
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RELIEF SOllCllT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to overturn the decree of reformat ion, on the grounds that the judt;ment entered Has c,)ntrary
to law and wholly unsupported by the evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
In December, 1976, the parties entered into a
Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale by Plaintiffs to
Defendants of a cafe, store and motel in Virgin, Utah. The
contract provided for a sale price of $51,000, payable by a

$22,000 initial deposit and monthly $200.00 installments,
said installments applying to interest accruing at 87, per
annum and then to principal.
Defendants could not sell their home and certain
personal pro?erty to fund the substantial down payment, and
sought to renegotiate the contract.

The parties agreed on a

reduction in the down payment provided that the Defendantpurchasers would assume obligations of the contract by which
Sellers Here themselves purchasing the business (Severson
contract).

At trial the parties disputed the amount which

was to be paid down but all admitted a reduction was agrerd
upon.
In March, 1977, the parties ·went to a title company and met with Mr. Allan Carter.

They inforc:ied him of

the terms of the transaction and requested he prepare the
necessary documents.

He informed them it \vould tCJ.l:e a very,

1 Except where specific:=il ly no:-:ed, facts are s taterl as fo 1-''"
by the 101-1er couc:t.

1
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very lonz time to pay the contract off due to the large
prlncipCll balance and small monthly payments.
The parties left the title company.
Smith later discussed the matter.

T 22:5-10.

Mr. Carter and Mr.
Mr. Smith instructed Mr.

Carter to prepare the contract to provide for interest on
the unpaid balance at 8% per annum, through the first year
only, with no interest thereafter.

Only 12 years of

payments would be required.
Mr. Carter's uncontradicted testimony was that he
contacted Mr. Thompson to verify the acceptability of this
change, and that Hr. Thompson did not object.

T 74:27 -

75:17; see T 39:14 - 40:8
The parties met March 29, 1977, in a bank in
Hurricane, Utah, to execute the papers.

The bank was to act

as escrow agent.
The closing was not uneventful.
and discussion.

There was argument

Defendant testified the meeting was one and

one-half to two hours in length.

The contract (or at least

parts related to interest and down payment) was read by the
T Lf2:23 - 43:18; 64:6-14.

bank officer to the Sellers.

The

bank officer attenpted to call Nr. Carter to question him
about the contract but was unable to reach him.

27:19.

T 26:30 -

There was heated discussion of the reduced down

payment and interest rate.

Finally Hrs. Thompson said

"Let's sign it; we've been on this for so many months; lets
get it over with; let us be done with it."

T 30:1-3;
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47:16-18; 96:15-16. The parties executed the document and
left the bank.
A few days later the Thompsons requested the tit],,
company draw up another contract providing for

int•~rest

throughout the term of the contract, at 8% per annul'.l. Uhen
Smjths refused to sign it, suit was filed.
Purchaser-appellants contended at trial and now
contend that the only interpretation o E the evidence is that
the seller-respondents knew the nature of the document they
signed, did so freely and voluntarily and should not now be
al lowed to renege, rewriting the agreement in their favor.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DECREE FOR REFORMATION IJAS
CONTRARY TO LAW, BEING BASED UPON
A FINDING OF "NO MEETING OF THE
MINDS."

The findings of the Court below reflect that the
language of the contract was reformed because the Court felt
there was no "meeting of the TTlinds" on the interest term.

17. That the agreement entered ini:o by and between
the parties on March 29, 1977 did not coritain the
agreement bi::tween the pa.rties as it pertained to.
the payment of interest and the parties had prev10 11 s
had a meeting of minds on the p.:tyment of interest ~
in the amount of 8 percent per annum simple interesc
18. That because of the same, there was no~
of the minds between the parties in the agreement
of March 29, 1977 wherein the Plaintiffs were
Sellers and the Defendants w2re Buyers of the
.
above described real property regnrcling the p:iyn' 1 '
of interest.
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19. That the actual 1';eeting of the minds between
the parties was to the effect that interest would
be paid on the outstanding balance of said contract
at the rate of 8 percent per annum simple interest
from the date of execution of the same until the
outstanding principal balance plue interest was
paid in full, and that each payment would be
applied first to the payment of accrued interest
and second to the reduction of principal.
Findings of Fact, H 17-19 (emphasis added)
While it is true that reformation is granted in
cases in which there has been no meeting of minds on the
written document, that lack alone will not justify reformation. The lack of meeting of minds is a result of the specific
circumstances which justify reformation.

But a lack of

meeting of minds may also result from mere unilateral mistake
which does not justify reformation.

Reformation will only

be granted in a case of mutual mistake or in a case of
unilateral mistake brought about by fraud or concealment.
There are two basic grounds for the reformation of
\Yritten instruments which do not correctly state
and embody the intention and pre-existing agreement
of the parties to the instrument, namely, (1)
mutual mistake of the parties and (2) ignorance or
mistake of the complaining party coupled with or
induced by the fraud or inequitable conduct of the
other or remaining parties. 66 Am.Jur. 2d
Reformation of Instruments §12 (1973).
The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment make no
mention of mutual mistake nor do they mention unilateral
mistake and fraud.
Court.

These doctrines were ignored by the

Reformation was declared simply because in the

CoLtrt 's vic\v, Plaintiffs either did not understand or did
not agree with the terms of the document they signed though
they knew its nature.
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POINT II

THERF: WAS N;J EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
FHJDING MUTUAL MISTAKE OR lltlILAmr
MISTAKE AND FRAUD.
-

Even if it is assumed that the Court's

findin~

and conclusion were based on the correct legal doctrines,
(though unstated in the pleadings) there is no evidenc:_ to
support those doctrines; there is in fact substantial contra:
evidence.

Mutual Mistake
At the outset, it is clear that any mistake was
not mutual.

Mr. Smith knew the nature and import of the

interest provision. T 116:28 - 117:1

It was stipulated that

he informed Hr. Carter to draft that provision.

T 117: 29 - I

Unilateral Mistake and Fraud
While the record clearly shows Mr. Thompson's
suspicions were aroused, it may be that he still did not
understand the interest provision after he signed the agreement and left the bank, and that he labored under a unilateral mistake.
Hm1ever, there is no evidence to show fraud or anj
misconduct on Mr. Smith's part.

Thompson's testimony ~

mentions Smith stating anything deceptive at the bank.
knew Smith's position.

He

If Thompson was misled, it 1vas by

the bo.n~c officer, Mr. Nackos.

Under direct examination hy

his counsel Thompson states something cau[;ht his eye uhik
arguing with Smith about th'-' clo;m paymeLlt:
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d

A.
Durini this process, I just 3lance sideways,
or just gl~nced at the amount, the amount printed
in the contract concerning interest.

Q.

What caught your eye in that regard?

A.
Hell, the standard contract, approximately a
sentence and a half, eight percent per annum on
unpaid balance, and that is what it was, and the
quantity that was in there.

Q.

What did you see regarding interest?

A.
I didn't read it at that time; I was ar gui,1g
with him, with Hr. Sl'lith.
I turned the paper and
I said, "Nick, there looks like something -- Mr.
Nackos, it looks as if something is wrong there on
the interest." As we continued talking about
this.
I finally agreed to the 6,500, to make a
long story short. T 25:29 - 26:13

* ** *
Q.
Then what occurred after that, after you
made that agreement?
A.
11!:. Nackos attempted to get hold of Allan
Carter, Mr. Carter.

Q.

Do you know for what reason?

A.

To clarify this.

Q.

What do you mean by "clarify this"?

A.
This is my assumption, clarify the interest
set up here, what it meant. T 26:28 - 27:6

**

-!:

*

Q.
(By Mr. Foremaster)
So then what occurred
after this attempt to get ahold of Mr. Carter on
the part of Mr. Nackos?

TUE COURT: What happened?
Q.

(By Mr. Foremaster) What happened?

A.

He went through it again.

Q.
What do you mean by "went through it," what
did he do?
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A.

lie studi_1'd it.

Q.

Then what occurred?

A.
Here again, it's hard for me to kr=co uithir
thP Judge's --

Q.

No, you are all right.
to you?

Did anyone say anythi,

A.
My recollection was, that he said that it
would be all right, that the first year 1:1as --it
would be all right from then on.
O.

Now, ,/ho said that to you?

A.

Mr. Nackos.

T 28:11 - 29

See also Mrs. Thompson's corrohorating testimony
at T 95:28 - 96:8.

Both Plaintiffs testified that

they were aware of the ?roblem.
And the Court specifically found Thompsons were
aware of the interest problem; that there was a dispute.

13. That on March 29, 1977 at the meeting in the
office of Nick liackos at Zions ?irs t Natio:i'-'l fL1'<
in Hurricane, Utah between the parties, the contrac'.
was read to the parties, and some discussion 113.s
had rega:::din;; the payment of provisions for interesc
as cal led for thereby as the same was difficult if
not imoossible for the Plaintiffs to understand or
for th~ bank officer to understand.
14. That pursuant to said negotiation, the parties
attempted to contact Allan C'lrter, the preo,:n:2r o'.
said a;:;reernent, to ask hi111 to expL1in the terT'ls
and conditions of sa:i.d contract as it uertained to
interest, hmvever it was f1)und imrJossible to
contact Al L1'1 Carte::-, and th·:::!refo"!:°e the provi:.io1s
of said contract re(';arcling the payment o[ interest
was not explained by the preparer of the agrceme'1L
Findings of Fact '111 13, 14.
It is important to note that the Court found only
that the provision "was not explain2d hy the prcp:nc>r."
There is no findin.c; as to Mr. Thornp;;on 's
Mr. l'lackos' explanation.

unclerstanc!ir·~ M

1>fl1ile c:1refully avoitiinf'
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1

n:r

1

st;i1-._,rnt:'nt that he "ci_dvised" the Thompsons (see T 54: 27 '.J'.i:'l;

6.S:'Uf - 69:li'f) lTr. Uackos stated he understood it and

que:.tioned Tho,npsons about it.
stated Uackos advised them.

T 64:28 - 65:6.

T 28: 11-29.

ThoG1psons

The T}1onpsons

testified they just wanted to sign and get out of there,
even though they did not understand it.

T 98:7-20.

Even allowing for interpretation of the ambiguous
evidence to support a finding of unilateral mistake by
Thompsons it is clear that Mr. Smith did not lie to llr.
Thompson; nor did he conceal the nature of the provision.
He was guilty of no misconduct.

There is no evidence in the

record to establish any inequitable conduct on his part.

POINT III

THOMPSONS WERE GUILTY OF
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE.

A basic principle of the reformation doctrine is
that reformation will be denied to one guilty of inexcusable
negligence in executing an instrument.
In Smith v. Whit law, 268 P. 2d 1031 (Colo. 1954) a
corporation president sought to escape personal liability on
a contract, though he was named personally as purchaser. He

claimed that the corporate attorney, in revising the

for~

presented by the seller, failed to delete personal references,
and that the seller was aware that the purchase was corporate,
not personal.
The Colorado Court reviewed the evidence and
stat~d

the applicable law.
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......

A study of tre testimony briefly SUIT10.<Hi_,,er
herein clearly discloses that there was no mutu,i]
mistake made by both Sc1ith and H2ndrick:->0;1 in t!"
matter of the capacity of the parties; and ilCce:i~'·i
Srriith' s and his attorney's testinv:rny, at hest it-- I
would be only a unilateral mistake on the Dart of
Smith, and further, there is no fraud or wroncrfu1
conduct disclosed in the evidence on the part~£
Hendrickson.
It further is shown that Eendricksoo
fully complied with every part of the ocntrilct.
It must be remembered that Smith had an oppori:unit':
to read the second and final draft of the coritract.
but neglected to do so .
. '
1

. . . In the case of Muchow v. Central City Gold
Mines Co., 100 Colo. 58, 65 P.2d 702, our Court,
in effect, said that a contract, such as is no1
before us, will not be reformed on the ground of
mistake at the instance of the party who prep8.red
it when it appears that his alleged lack of knowlec
was due to his failure to exercise reasonable
diligence; and further, that equity will not
relieve a party from the ill effects of a contract
voluntarily executed, on the r;round of mutual
.
mistake, ,;here he could have been fully advised by I
the exercise of reasonable diligence.
268 P.2d at I
1034, 1035
'
Admittedly, each case must be decided upon its mm i
facts.

However, some similarities must be noted.
Thompsons were aware of the interest provision;

aware at least th.'!t they did not understand it and mvare
that it did not mean eight per cent per annum.

They e::ecutei

the document fully aware of these factors, too:, the down
payment, were relieved of the obligation of the Severson
contract and only later changed their minds.
Their actions, viewed objectively, establish their ,
acquiescence and agreement, barring any claim for relief.
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-CONCLUS IOtl

THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE ENFORCED
AS \'TRITTEN

While Thompsons acted quickly to correct their

'I
I

mi.stci.ke, they did not act -- or refuse to act -- quickly
enough.

They should have refused to sign at the closing

rather than acquiesce, sign and file suit.
Mr. Smith is guilty of no reprehensible conduct;

L,

rather, he made a proposal which reduced his total liability
eliminating additional years of payments. Thompsons were
aware, accepted, but reconsidered.

Their reconsideration

should not be allowed at his expense.
Respectfully Submitted March 10, 1980.

'i

I

II

MAILING CERTIFICATE
J /1--z;;t:
I hereby certify that on the L.fL.__ day of March,

1980, I served a copy of the foregoing

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

on Phillip L. Foremaster Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents,
by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, addressed to 494 East
Tabernacle, St. George, Utah, 84770.
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